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FORGIVENESS AND PUBLIC TRUST
Linda Ross Meyer*
Gentlemen of the jury, if we convict and punish him, he will say
to himself: ... I am even, I owe them nothing now, and owe no
one anything forever and ever .... But do you want to punish
him fearfully, terribly, with the most awful punishment that
could be imagined, and at the same time to save him and regen-
erate his soul? If so, overwhelm him with your mercy! He will
be horror-stricken; he will be crushed by remorse and the vast
obligation laid upon him henceforth. And he will not say then,
"I am even," but will say, "I am guilty in the sight of all men and
am more unworthy than all."1
Is forgiveness a personal, emotional experience unfitted for the
public realm? Many have argued that only victims can forgive, and
that justice, respect for victims and'equal protection of the laws are
sacrificed when forgiveness overflows its smallish province. 2 I re-
spectfully disagree and venture to support the idea that forgiveness
is neither just personal, "merely" emotional, nor only private, but
that forgiveness grounds the basic trust that makes community
possible.
In order to understand why someone other than a direct victim
may forgive a wrong, it is important to look closely at our concept
of wrong itself, and to see that a wrong is public, not just private or
personal. Part I addresses this issue. Once wrong is understood as
the breach of a community bond, I undertake some explanation of
community, which is the subject of Part II. In Part III, I argue that
forgiveness should not only be understood as an emotional experi-
ence, but also as including cognitive and speech-act dimensions;
hence, forgiveness is not just a subjective emotional experience by
a particular victim. I explain why community members not only
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac Law School. I thank Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Neal Feigenson, Steve Latham, Jeff Meyer and Ron Olson for comments and sugges-
tions on earlier drafts, and I thank Dean Feerick, the members of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal, and the participants of The Role of Forgiveness in the Law Symposium
held on January 28, 2000 for enriching my understanding of forgiveness.
1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 710 (1976).
2. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
1-34; 162-86 (1988); Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); LEWIS B. SMEDES, THE ART OF FORGIVING 39
(1996).
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can, but ought to, forgive. I then sketch briefly the relationship of
this community forgiveness to punishment and (human) justice.
I. WHAT'S WRONG WITH WRONG
Relegating mercy or forgiveness to the private realm results in
part from assuming that crime wrongs only its direct victims (those
who suffer tangible pain or loss from the crime3), and that there-
fore only those direct victims have standing to seek redress or to
forgive. If the wrong of wrong, however, was limited to its tangible
effects on the victim - to its harm, that is - several rather strange
consequences would follow. First, there would be no wrong to vic-
tims who suffered no harm (no mental or physical pain). Even the
sense of insult, invasion and betrayal that accompanies otherwise
harmless or attempted crime, and hence differentiates crime from
misfortunes, would go unfelt by an infant, for example, or a men-
tally ill person. Taking candy from a baby would not only be easy,
it would be morally neutral. Second, wrong would be greater in
proportion to the harm done. Momentary negligence that caused
serious and permanent physical injury would be a greater wrong
than malicious but impotent racial animus.
Of course, we do believe that infants can be wronged, and we
grade crimes by the offender's mens rea, not the tort measure of
damages done. So what is wrong with wrong, if not the physical
and mental harm to the victim?
Another common but unworkable suggestion of what's wrong
with wrong is that it free-rides on the sacrifices of others.4 So un-
derstood, wrong does wrongs more than the direct victim because
it creates unfairness in the distribution of liberty. But this sugges-
tion would mean that the only community members who are
wronged are those who restrain their criminal impulses merely in
order to get the benefit of others' like restraint. Those who simply
have no criminal impulses in the first place would have no standing
to complain. In other words, only potential criminals would be
wronged by wrong.
The problem with the traditional theories of wrong is that they
rest on social contract premises, presuming that right is defined by
a social contract that answers the following question: why would
equal individuals associate and cooperate with each other? The
answer is always in terms of getting goods available only through
3. For an account of wrong that would ground such a view, see Heidi M. Hurd,
What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994).
4. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968).
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social cooperation (such as property or safety). Hence, wrong is
defined as maldistribution or individual loss. The problem lies with
the question, however - it assumes that we are individuals who
must be somehow bonded to each other.
If one assumes the other optional default position, i.e., that we
are already bonded,5 the question about wrong is asked differently.
The wrong of wrong is not harm to the victim as an individual, but
the breaking of trust with one's community and the injury to the
victim as a community member. The bonds between members of a
community are not tangible as physical injury or property loss, but
they are nonetheless real. As Hannah Arendt states:
The physical, worldly in-between along with its interests is
overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an altogether different
in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its ori-
gin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one an-
other. This second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since
there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; the
process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results
and end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is
no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common.
We call this reality the "web" of human relationships, indicating
by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality.6
Accordingly, Nietzsche7 (as well as Durkheim8 and Hegel9) saw
crime as the moment of the individual's emergence as an individ-
5. Other societies may understand this more deeply. For example, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu has explained the African concept of Ubuntu as the following:
It speaks about the essence of being human: that my humanity is caught up
in your humanity because we say a person is a person through other persons.
I am a person because I belong. The same is true for you. The solitary
human being is a contradiction in terms. That is why God could say to
Adam, "It is not good for man to be alone." No one can be fully human
unless he or she relates to others in a fair, peaceful, and harmonious way. In
our African understanding, we set great store by communal peace and har-
mony. Anything that subverts this harmony is injurious, not just to the com-
munity, but to all of us, and therefore forgiveness is an absolute necessity for
continued human existence.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Foreword to EXPLORING FORGIVENESS xiii (Robert D.
Enright & Joanna North eds., 1998).
6. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 182-83 (1958) (emphasis
omitted).
7. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 98-99 (R.J. Hollingdale
trans., 1896).
8. See DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 73-75 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds.,
1983); EMILE DURKHEIM, ON MORALITY AND SOCIETY 114-33 (Robert N. Bellah ed.,
1973).
9. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 99 (T.M. Knox trans., 1st ed.
1952). For full treatment of Hegel's understanding of punishment/sanction, see Phi-
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ual, as an entity separable and separate from the community, an
"outlaw," someone standing outside the law defining the
community. 10
Seeing the wrong of crime as a breach of public trust solves the
following puzzles:
1) Why do we care so much about mens rea?
We care because the guilty mind has set itself against, strayed
farther from, the norms of the community.
2) Why do we require public prosecutions?
We require them because the guilty person has betrayed us all
and broken the communal bonds.
3) Why do we understand wrong "objectively," as something
apart from the subjective experiences of crime victims (and hence
something that exists even when the victim is unaware of it)?
We understand wrong "objectively" because the wrong is in part
the breaking of the social bond, and the objective (that is, public)
disrespect shown to the victim (whether or not the particular victim
feels loss or pain, and whether or not the victim understands the
wrong as disrespectful).
Indeed, even the individual victim's experience of being wronged
is formed in part by public norms - what counts as insulting or
even assaultive behavior, what counts as theft, what counts as rape,
what counts as carelessness, what counts as the act of a "guilty
mind" rather than a mere misfortune are all public norms (imper-
fectly embodied in criminal and tort law). It is because the victim
is a member of a community that she sees herself as a victim of a
malicious or reckless act, rather than as a victim of circumstance or
bad fortune. Her trust and security are shattered precisely because
another community member has violated the expectations and
trust that are so basic to social interaction they become unspoken
expectations in any encounter with another.
lippe Nonet, Sanction, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 489 (1995); see also TRISHA OLSON, PUNISH-
MENT AS COMING HOME (1989) (unpublished paper on file with author, construing
Hegelian view of punishment as atonement).
10. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 7, at 98-99. Nietzsche celebrates the assertion of
free will that is implicit in the criminal act. The deep irony of crime is that it is in
rebellion against law/God that we actualize our individuality and experience a sense
of free will. We will to be gods unto ourselves - overcoming the conditioned nature
of our own finitude. The freedom we achieve, however, is only nihilistic negative
freedom - the destruction of the conditions of our being, doing, or thinking anything
at all. "The sole and desolate being of the wrong lies in the outcast existence of the
broken will, seeking itself in the night of its own self-estrangement, and crying the
word of despair in the work of wrong." Nonet, supra note 9, at 514-15.
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IH. WHAT COMMUNITY BONDS?
We like to think that in our diverse world, we no longer have
community, and hence no basis for talking in terms of community
norms. Which community: the suburban, inner-city, African-
American, Catholic, gay, skin-head, survivalist or intellectual? We
have so many different cross-threads in our culture that we can
each define ourselves in myriad ways. I'm white, Midwestern, veg-
etarian, environmentalist, intellectual, Anglo, WASP, academic,
leftist, Lutheran, feminist, pro-family, straight, democratic, upper-
middle class, middle-aged, professional, small-town, Irish, married-
with-children, pro-gay, etc. There is no one community, and per-
haps even these labels describe only interest groups, not true
communities.
And yet, deep beneath the all-too obvious differences between
us, we share a great deal that goes unnoticed because it is assumed.
We speak similar languages that share deep roots and common an-
cestors. Our common linguistic heritage means that we share many
basic concepts, concepts that include understandings of meaningful
human action and basic norms of respect. Anthropology would not
be possible without these deepest of all commonalities - the abil-
ity (even need) to make sense of another's action as intentional
and meaningful, to recognize, as Kant would say,1' that we all are
creatures of reason.
The way we make sense of each others' actions lies deep in our
language and understanding of the world, given to us by a common
past. The post-modern discovery that we are "socially con-
structed" beings is now commonplace, usually asserted to under-
score cultural differences and distinctions, but it also entails that we
have a deep connection to each other - we already share lan-
guage, ways of thinking, ways of feeling, and ways of going on that
we were born into and that shape our human world. We may vary
in our expressions of respect, in the details of our expectations and
our norms, but we still share some bedrock.
From a "communitarian" standpoint, I have described a fairly
"thin" or "watered-down" community, a community that still con-
tains deep normative divisions. But this "deep community" is still
a very important, if not a very salient one, for it grounds our basic
intuitions about right and wrong, what counts as a human goal,
what counts as rational, and what counts as intelligible.
11. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE META-
PHYSIC OF MORALS 56-58 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1987).
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When we meet a stranger, we assume that stranger will make
sense. We must assume this in order to get the process of interpre-
tation off the ground.12 Part of "making sense" is having goals that
we can recognize as human goods, and part of making sense is fit-
ting into cultural "scripts" that we recognize. 13 We assume, at least
until we have evidence otherwise, that the stranger is not mali-
cious, is not crazy, and that we can communicate with him or her.
This is basic public trust. It is the necessary beginning for any
human interaction - buying a cup of coffee at McDonald's, walk-
ing across a street on a green light or taking a seat on a bus. More
personal relationships also build special trust, but the basic public
trust is necessary for simply leaving the house in the morning.
Do we really trust each other? What about the wary meeting of
black and white on a city street?' 4 The assumptions of bad faith in
a "high crime" area? 15 The discriminatory mistrust shown a black
woman by a Benetton store?' 6 How can I speak of public trust, or
single communities, in such a world?
I can speak of public trust in our world because we still think of
these scenarios as "problems" we would like to solve. We notice
them and dwell on them precisely because they "stick out" and are
salient. The background they stick out from is still trust, the taken-
for-granted trust that most of us operate with most of the time, the
trust we don't even notice. Next time you drive on the highway,
notice how much you trust the other drivers - to stay in their lane,
to go the right direction, to avoid radical changes of speed, not to
bump you off the road intentionally, etc.
12. See DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACrIONS AND EVENTS 221-23 (1980).
13. See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY
1-19 (1998).
14. See Jerome -McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and
Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 553 (1991)
(describing a black-white encounter and calling into question the application of tradi-
tional tort law concepts).
15. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676-77 (2000) (upholding a Terry-stop
based on "reasonable suspicion" when the police saw the defendant run away from
them in a "high crime" area). The Court said that running away in such a setting
could be enough for police to reasonably suspect a person of a crime. See id. The
dissent, by Justice Stevens, countered that those who live in high crime areas may
have innocent reasons to fear and flee the police, given the level of police harassment
and brutality, and the likelihood of being caught in the cross-fire of a violent situation.
See id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's assumption that the guilty are
more likely to flee the police than the innocent assumes a certain level of public trust;
the dissent questions that assumption. See id. at 679-80.
16. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-47 (1991)
(telling the story of her exclusion from a Benetton store).
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The more deeply a crime breaches basic public trust, the more
"strange," "inhuman" and "senseless" it seems. The criminal ap-
pears to stand out from the "rest of us" as incomprehensible, inas-
similable. We ask, why would anyone do this? The criminal is an
individual, an outlaw, a predator, 7 a monster, 8 a barbarian,1 9
outside the bounds of human comprehension and community. The
breach of public trust creates a chilling shiver of fear and insecurity
because it strikes at the very bonds that make it possible for us to
live together.
1I. REINTERPRETATION OF FORGIVENESSIMERCY
If a non-victim community member can forgive, forgiveness must
be more than the subjective emotional experience of overcoming
anger or resentment. I acknowledge that when a victim has the
courage and generosity to forgive a wrongdoer, the victim is chang-
ing the way she feels about the wrongdoer. To change one's emo-
tions, however, one has to change one's mind. Emotions are
cognitive at least in part,2° otherwise they would not be amenable
to conscious change, and forgiveness would be only an event, not a
virtue.2' Hence, forgiveness cannot be "just" a change in how one
feels.
17. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C, §§ 7-8 (West 1999) (describing New Jersey's en-
actment of "sexual predator" statutes); Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Min-
dless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 669-70 (1998) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
to uphold Kansas's sexual predator law).
18. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, The Monsters Next Door: A Special Report on the Colo-
rado School Massacre, TIME, May 3, 1999, at 20; LEwis B. SMEDES, FORGIVE AND
FORGET: HEALING THE HURTS WE DON'T DESERVE 106 (1984) (referring to forgiv-
ing "monsters"); Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363,
1421 (1995) (presenting an account of a gangster whose "nom de guerre" is "Mon-
ster" Kody).
19. "Barbarian" was the word the Greeks used to refer to those whom they could
not understand; whose language sounded like "barbarbar." See WEBSTER'S THIRD
INT'L DICrIONARY 174 (1986). Someone who does not make sense is a barbarian.
See id.
20. For a sampling of this burgeoning literature, see SUSAN BANDES, THE PAS-
SIONS OF LAW (1999); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND
TALK ABoUr ACCIDENTS 69-86 (forthcoming May 2000); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1996); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN HELLENISTIC ETHICS 507-10 (1994).
21. See Joanna North, The "Ideal" of Forgiveness: A Philosopher's Exploration, in
EXPLORING FORGIVENESS, supra note 5, at 20 (arguing that for forgiveness to have
moral value, it must be an active process, and not a "mere cessation of hostile
feelings").
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As philosophers, theologians and psychologists have recognized,
forgiveness begins22 from a new vision of the wrongdoer that tries
to empathize with him and see him as more than his crime. 23 Un-
derstanding the wrongdoer and his action is a way of bringing him
back inside the human sense-making community so that he no
longer looks like an "inhuman predator" and stands out-law. Mak-
ing sense of the wrongdoer's action means looking at him as more
than his one act and filling out the picture of the past, as well as
acknowledging the possibilities inherent in his future, and seeing
him therefore once again inside the sphere of humanity.24 This ex-
panded frame of reference opens the possibility for the next aspect
of forgiveness - its forward-looking and action-oriented part - a
22. Before forgiveness can come into play, however, we must know much of the
truth of what happened and be able to characterize it as a wrong. This "moment of
truth" may be a confession followed by apology, see Symposium, The Role of Forgive-
ness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347, 1414-19 (2000) [hereinafter Forgiveness
Symposium] (remarks of Jonathan R. Cohen), or the result of a state investigation or
truth commission. The importance of saying the truth is rightly emphasized as the
beginning of the process of any forgiveness or reconciliation. See id. at 1436-40 (re-
marks of Juan Mdndez) (regarding the recognition of a human right to truth); Mar-
garet Walker, Forgiving: Not One Path, No Single Destination (forthcoming
conference paper to be published with Obert C. and Grace A. Tanner Humanities
Lectures, Apr. 13-14, 2000, Univ. of Utah) (emphasizing that a facet of forgiveness is
putting the wrong in the past - which requires factualizing it). Truth, of course, may
never be complete or undisputed or settled, but some resolution of it is perhaps the
beginning of the process. See Forgiveness Symposium, supra, at 1375-78 (remarks of
Frederick W. Gay) (describing the first part of a victim-offender mediation as often
involving a clarification of what happened and why).
23. See G.W.F. Hegel, Who Thinks Abstractly?, in TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 116-
17 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1977).
A murderer is led to the place of execution. For the common populace he is
nothing but a murderer. Ladies perhaps remark that he is a strong, hand-
some, interesting man. The populace finds this remark terrible: What? A
murderer handsome? How can one think so wickedly and call a murderer
handsome; no doubt, you yourselves are something not much better! ... This
is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact
that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this
simple quality.
Id.
24. See LEwIS SMEDES, FORGIVE AND FORGET 45-49 (1984); North, supra note 21,
at 26-27; MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 84-87; Everett L. Worthington, Jr.,
The Pyramid Model of Forgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations about Un-
forgiveness and the Promotion of Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS: PSY.
CHOLOGICAL RESEARCH & THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 118-23 (Everett L.
Worthington, Jr. ed., 1997). This expansion in view also works on the victim as well,
making the victim aware that her life, too, is not defined and confined by the crime.
She is not just a "victim." Hence, forgiveness is said to set the victim free from the
crime as well. See Smedes, Worthington, supra.
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commitment to "deal" with the wrongdoer that paves the way for
potential reconciliation.
That the victim is committed to deal with the offender does not
instantly put the offender back at status quo ante. The battered
woman need not welcome her abuser back into the home. It
merely places the victim at the table, ready to begin the perhaps
painful process of working on a rapprochement, and further pro-
gress depends on the remorse and return of the offender.
This "commitment to deal" is a necessary part of forgiveness,25
so that forgiveness is not just an emotional change in the victim. If
you say you forgive me, but will not talk to me or interact with me
in any way, then I do not believe you have forgiven me. Forgiving
may not require forgetting, but our usual use of the term means
more than "I'm not actively angry anymore." I can also imagine
someone saying, "I am still angry, but I forgive you anyway." (I
have said so myself, to my children.) Here, "I forgive you" looks
like a speech act26 - a commitment to deal.27 Emotion may lag
behind, but the commitment is the key.
If reconciliation is central to forgiveness, however, how can we
forgive the dead, as we say we do? If they are dead, we can no
longer have a future relationship with them, can we?28 On the con-
trary, the "forgiving of the dead" may also be more than an emo-
tional experience. The public rehabilitation of the deceased's
memory, or a "clearing of her name," may mean something much
more like forgiveness as reconciliation than forgiveness as emo-
tional transition. We honor the dead with medals, remember them
with statues, poems, music and art. We read and argue with the
dead all the time (especially we philosophers). All of these actions
are quite public and much more akin to active reconciliation than
subjective emotional experience. The communal remembering that
keeps great spirits in our midst, even after their bodies are gone, is
25. See, e.g., Martin E. Marty, The Ethos of Christian Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS
OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 23, at 9; Elliot N. Dorff, The Elements of Forgiveness: A
Jewish Approach, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 23, at 29. Both au-
thors argue that return or reconciliation is at least one facet of forgiveness.
26. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 12 (1962) (arguing that
one's statement can also be described as an act).
27. Others have argued, with Murphy, that forgiveness is not performative. See,
e.g., R.S. Downie, Forgiveness, 15 PHIL. Q. 128, 132 (1965); H.J.N. Horsbrugh, For-
giveness, 4 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 269, 270 (1974). But see William R. Neblett, Forgive-
ness and Ideals, 83 MIND 269 (1974) (defending the idea that "I forgive" may
sometimes be performative).
28. Jeffrie Murphy makes this objection in his conference remarks. See Forgive-
ness Symposium, supra note 22, at 1353-66 (Keynote address of Jeffrie G. Murphy).
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part of what it is to be part of community and therefore linked to
the past.
We are not, however, any more "at risk" from the dead. They
can do no further wrong to us. Or can they? Are we safe from
Hitler because he is dead? Or is he, and what he stands for, not
still a risk? Does he not still gain admirers and adherents? Though
sometimes the forgiveness of the dead is a bit cheap (it is often all
too easy to "forgive" when we are safe), the dead do haunt us still.
What becomes impossible, however, is for the dead to change,
grow, or learn. Hence, they cannot meet forgiveness half-way to
complete the reconciliation. We may gain new information about
who they were, but we are stuck with the past as best we can know
it.
In sum, the victim's forgiveness means, in part, seeing the of-
fender as a sense-making member of the human community and
committing to deal with him again. These actions require that the
victim herself be a member of the community, for they employ
public norms of what counts as sense-making and what counts as
"being a member" again. Hence, it is not the victim as subjective
sufferer who forgives, but the victim as member of the public com-
munity, the victim as an "Everyman."
If forgiveness is in part sense-making and committing to deal,
then forgiveness is not just a change in "subjective" feelings, and
therefore not restricted in principle to victims. In fact, the victim
might forgive, while the community may not.29 Community mem-
bers who are indignant, shocked and baffled by a criminal's actions
and who have lost their trust in him can also undergo the discipline
of sense-making and committing to deal. I argue, indeed, that this
is part of the ritual of public punishment (below). The breach of
public trust is not just a wrong to the direct victim, but a wrong to
all whose security and trust are broken by crime.
Just because non-victims can forgive, it does not follow that they
have standing to forgive, or ought to forgive even when the victim
refuses. Isn't it presumptuous and doesn't it demean and trivialize
the victim's pain to forgive on the victim's behalf? How could I
29. See, e.g., Rachel Gottlieb, Victims: Megan's Law Backfires: In Some Family
Abuse Cases, Publicity Compounds the Hurt, HARTFORD COURANT, March 3, 1999, at
1 (reporting that Megan's law injures a victim's family when the father-abuser, after
years of intensive counseling, reconciles with the family and resides at the same ad-
dress, but neighbors will not attend the victim's birthday parties and send hate-mail to
the family).
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presume, for example, to forgive Hitler or Stalin or the murderer
of someone else's child? 30
Though this is a powerful objection, I believe it makes two mis-
takes. First, it takes a see-saw view of punishment that understands
punishment as a reaffirmation of the victim's value, which the
crime has devalued (victim goes up when offender goes down). I
explore this further in Part IV. Second, it ignores the fact that the
future-looking nature of forgiveness is risky not only for the victim,
but also for other potential victims. The community representative
is a potential victim and must be willing personally to take the risk
of recommitment to dealing with the offender. From this angle, the
victim can never forgive only for himself, but must forgive for the
future and for the future potential victims. 31
One problem arises when violence or wrong is done within a
subcommunity. Can representatives of a non-minority group for-
give a wrong targeted at a minority group only? I would venture
that the community doing the forgiving must be the community "at
risk" and in relationship with the offender. There is no coming
over to the other, and hence, no forgiveness, when one need not
"deal" with the offender because one is a stranger and is not at
risk.32
IV. FORGIVENESS AND PUNISHMENT
Many scholars have pointed out that retributive justice is the
only morally defensible current theory of punishment; utilitarian
theories always have the difficulty that there is no utilitarian reason
not to punish the innocent if it will achieve whatever good end is
prescribed by the theory (e.g., deterrence, education, victim sup-
port, etc.). 33 Yet, even in retributivism's most persuasive guise, it
30. See, e.g., LEWIS B. SMEDES, THE ART OF FORGIVING 39 (1996) ("No one -
not a president, not a peasant - has a right to forgive anyone for wounds he himself
did not suffer. Charity for the mothers of Nazi sons is fine. But no one but their
victims can forgive Nazi sons.").
31. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases:
A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1277-82 (1994) (arguing that victim-of-
fender mediation omits consideration of deterrence and other purposes of the state).
That even private forgiveness can have public consequences is exemplified in Jane
Austen's Pride and Prejudice when Jane and Elizabeth forbear from "exposing" the
character of Wickham. See JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 226-27, 277-78 (Ox-
ford Illus. ed. 1813). Their private act of forgiveness for his deceptions, of course,
results in his being able to seduce their sister Lydia. See id.
32. Punishment between strangers makes no sense either. See HERBERT MORRIS,
ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 96 (1976).
33. For excellent arguments against utilitarian theories of punishment, see Michael
Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE
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fails in its own aim - to end the cycle of vengeance. Instead, pun-
ishment must involve an element of forgiveness and even of mercy
(mitigation of just deserts). Hence, I disagree that forgiveness is an
optional "add-on" to punishment34 and also that mercy and for-
giveness differ as act versus emotion.
A. Retribution as a See-Saw
One of the most tempting formulations of retributivism takes se-
riously the dignitary harm done by crime and understands that
wrong is not just tangible harm, but also disrespect. The victim is
treated in a demeaning fashion by the criminal act, and even if the
victim's intrinsic worth is untouched, the victim's self-esteem may
be injured.35 Punishment, then, serves to show society's respect for
the victim by taking away the offender's wrongfully gained status,
honor or mastery and countering the message, implicit in the crimi-
nal act, that the victim does not count.36 I call this the see-saw view
of retribution, because it places the victim and offender on a moral
see-saw - as the offender goes up, the victim goes down and vice
versa. This sort of retribution is ultimately unsatisfying, however,
because it falsely ties the victim's value to the offender's punish-
ment. Moreover, we cannot "balance" victim and offender without
degrading the offender and perpetuating the wrong.
If we believed the victim's value to be tied to the offender's pun-
ishment, then it would be hard to justify the use of excuses in the
criminal law. For example, in a case of mistaken defense of others
(or "imperfect" self-defense), the victim is still assaulted intention-
ally and thereby demeaned - arguably demeaned even more in
that the offender unreasonably thought the victim was an aggres-
sor. To excuse the aggression (or even to mitigate the punishment)
because of the aggressor's unreasonable mistake would seem to
leave the victim at the low end of the see-saw, unredeemed and
undervalued. However, to punish the offender for a negligent act
to the same extent as for an intentional wrong also seems unjust.
EMOTIONS (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory
of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981).
34. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 182-83. Mercy is both required
and not deserved, a grace we are obligated to extend to offenders. See id. This takes
some of the "gift" nature away from forgiveness - though no less than the "duty" of
charity generally. See id. In parallel, one is obligated to be charitable, but no one has
a right to receive a gift. See id.
35. See David Sachs, How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFn. 346-60 (1981).
36. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 122-47.
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Instead, we must acknowledge that the victim's true worth or
dignity is never touched by criminal actions. The more society ac-
knowledges this, refuses to see the victim "as victim only" or as
sullied somehow by the crime, the better. Of course, society does
not always understand this, but tends to treat victims as pariahs, at
fault somehow, out of a reflexive urge to explain crime as some-
thing that will happen to others, not oneself.37 To the extent that
the conviction of an offender serves as a public acknowledgment
that the offender, not the victim, was wrong, the conviction or
guilty plea serves to fix blame and exonerate the victim (as a mat-
ter of communal psychology). But the extent of the punishment,
while a rough gauge of how seriously we take an offense, should
not be calibrated to the worth or redemption of the victim. We
have no business "valuing" the victim in the first place - the vic-
tim is beyond value, beyond price. Indeed, we often complain that
capital punishment, for example, is too likely to reflect a jury's
"valuation" of the victim rather than the crime.38
More telling, however, it seems that one can never achieve bal-
ance between the victim and offender unless the offender gets what
he dished out. Raping the rapist, beating up the bully or torturing
the torturer, however, only perpetuates the wrong, dehumanizing
the offender and the punisher as well. 39 If we accept some "moral
equivalent" but humane punishment instead, then the offender is
simply not balanced with the victim - reparation is no repara-
tion 40 - because part of the harm the victim suffers is the dignitary
harm of being treated offensively and demeaned.4 1 We cannot re-
store balance without demeaning the offender, and demeaning the
offender perpetuates the wrong.
37. See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors
Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61,
136-37 (1995).
38. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COMMISSION 114 (Stephen R. Donziger ed., 1996) (citing statistics that killers
of whites are eleven times more likely to get the death penalty than killers of blacks).
39. See James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107
YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). For a contemporary example, see Periscope, Pakistan, NEWS-
WEEK, Mar. 27,2000, at 5 (reporting the outcry over a murderer who was sentenced to
be strangled, cut into 100 pieces and put into acid).
40. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91-92 (1999); MIROSLAV VOLF, Ex-
CLUSION & EMBRACE: A THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF IDENTITY, OTHERNESS,
AND RECONCILIATION 122-23 (1996) (agreeing that punishment never repairs or re-
pays the victim).
41. See Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1931 (1992).
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When we promise victims closure, redemption from pain and
complete satisfaction through an offender's punishment, we lie to
them. We do not give offenders their just deserts, and if we did, we
would be wrong to do so. We must do more to help crime victims
than we do, and we should not lead them to expect all their solace
from punishment.
B. Retribution As Just Deserts
Another attractive vision of retribution is the idea that punish-
ment is nothing more than taking the offender seriously as a legis-
lator with free will in the Kantian kingdom of ends and
universalizing the maxim of his wrongful act so that it falls on his
own head.42 If I act with reason, then I will my action to be applied
in all similar cases. Therefore, if my action is criminal, then I will
that I be treated the same way in similar circumstances. Thus, if we
respect the offender as a reasonable actor, we should give him his
punishment, the punishment he has in a way decreed for himself.
To treat him any differently - to mitigate or excuse his act - is to
deny him his free will and personhood, to see him as subject to the
forces of cause and effect rather than able to act.43
Or, to put it at perhaps a deeper level: The criminal has actual-
ized his (negative) freedom by rejecting the moral standards of the
community, setting himself up as his own god. In doing so, how-
ever, he has negated the possibility of his own positive freedom as
a reasonable agent, for in rejecting cultural norms, he rejects the
norms that articulate and define reason itself. By rejecting that
which makes him what he is, he sets himself at war with himself.
He has put himself outside, made an exception of himself (as a
42. See KANT, supra note 11, at 49.
43. See Morris, supra note 33; HEGEL, supra note 9, 100.
[The penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly just - as
just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right; on
the contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e., in
his objectively embodied will, in his action. The reason for this is that his
action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is something
universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law which he has
explicitly recognized in his action and under which in consequence he should
be brought as under his right... punishment is regarded as containing the
criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a rational
being. He does not receive this due of honour unless the concept and mea-
sure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still less does he re-
ceive it if he is treated either as a harmful animal who has to be made
harmless, or with a view to deterring and reforming him.
HEGEL, supra note 9, 100.
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Kantian would put it44), by adopting a course of action for others
that he would not will for himself. Punishment, by bringing home
to him the universalized consequences of his own action, restores
him to the human community and makes of him a creature of rea-
son once more. His "will" is broken to the yoke of reason and he is
rescued from the oblivion of his rebellion from his own humanity.
In his return, the law of reason itself becomes actualized in the
world - has power, is at work45 - and the renewed being together
with others becomes a chosen, active expression of positive free-
dom rather than a mere status quo ante.46 The bond of community
itself is felt, seen, and active in the world, instead of merely in-
ferred from the fact of living alongside one another. The prodigal
son's return is cause for celebration; the reunion of father and son
is more salient and vivid than the preexisting union because it has
been explicitly chosen and longed for, rather than taken for
granted.
Again, however, the problem of moral equivalence haunts us.
The wrongness of the wrong that the offender committed is in part
in its disrespect for and humiliation of others. Yet, to give him "his
just deserts," or the full recoil of his own dehumanizing action,
would be to disrespect and humiliate him - contrary to the very
rule of respect to which we want to bring him home. Hence, he
cannot get his just deserts and return to the community.
The problem is that the universalization of the offender's maxim
(rule of action) is not possible unless the premise of inequality on
which that maxim relies is rejected. In assuming that the maxim
applies to all "like cases," we must treat the criminal herself as
"like us," thereby granting her the respect due a rational being. So,
we have already "brought her back to us" in the very act of trying
to universalize her action. We cannot then demean her without
violating the condition precedent to universalizing her maxim -
her own humanity. The very attempt to "give her her just deserts"
requires giving her less than her just deserts.
44. See KANT, supra note 11, at 52.
45. See HEGEL, supra note 9, 97.
46. See id. 220 ("Objectively, this is the reconciliation of the law with itself; by
the annulment of the crime, the law is restored and its authority is thereby actualized.
Subjectively, it is the reconciliation of the criminal with himself, i.e. with the law
known by him as his own and as valid for him and his protection; when this law is
executed upon him, he finds in this process the satisfaction of justice and nothing save
his own act.").
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C. Punishment As Atonement
In the end, it is not the equivalence of punishment to the crime
that is important, but the return to community. Hence, punish-
ment is exactly NOT the criminal's due, but a mitigated one - a
merciful one. In this view, mercy must be part of every punish-
ment, because punishment is never equal to the crime without be-
ing criminal.47 The criminal does not get her due, but receives
grace - and is, as Dostoevsky would say, forever in our debt and
therefore forever tied and obligated to us in relationship.
4 8
Punishment thought this way looks more like a form of forgive-
ness - a bringing home of the offender and being again willing to
deal with her. Because punishment is bounded by the humanity of
the community, it is never equivalent to the crime, but always
merciful. Forgiveness, mercy, and punishment become interwoven
and inextricable. As Hegel, among others, has articulated, punish-
ment might look more like the religious practice of atonement than
the quid pro quo of retribution.49 Stephen Garvey, following the
religious model, suggests that atonement has two steps, expiation
and reconciliation.5" The first involves repentance, apology, repa-
ration and penance by the offender; the second, forgiveness by the
victim.51 As Garvey explains:
47. Jean Hampton disagrees that the confinement of punishment to the "humane"
should be considered mercy. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 160 (arguing
that offender's moral worth "must always be respected in the construction of a genu-
inely retributive, rather than vengeful, response[; s]o a judge isn't being merciful if he
refrains from torturing a torturer").
48. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1.
49. See Nonet, supra note 9, at 521 (quoting Hegel) (emphasis omitted):
As the fulfillment of this return, die Erinnerung is the at-one-ment of the
self with itself, in German die Versohnung, the return of the son to his filial
belonging with the father, that is mortal man's unity with the godhead. In
this return, the self rises again in its Auferstehung, its resurrection to its
proper identity with itself in the spirituality of selfhood. Hence it is that the
transformation of revenge into punishment accomplishes "the atonement of
the law with itself," as well as that "of the offender with himself," by which
"the law is restored," and "first known by the offender as his own," so that
he "finds in it the peace of justice."
HEGEL, supra note 9, 220. For an intriguing vision of punishment as atonement
using the Christian paradigm, see Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999).
50. See Garvey, supra note 49, at 1804-05. The parallel in Hegelian terms is die
Vernichtung, die Aufopferung, die Erinnerung and die Vers6hnung. See Nonet, supra
note 9, at 521-22. Both authors rightly emphasize the importance of remembering the
wrong, even while forgiving the wrongdoer. Forgiveness here is not condonation or
amnesia.
51. See Garvey, supra note 49, at 1805.
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the atonement model provides punishment with an end - the
atonement of the wrongdoer and his victim and the restoration
of the relationship that existed between them before the wrong
- but treats punishment as an intrinsically appropriate way in
which to pursue and achieve that end. The ends and means of
punishment are thus fused.52
If punishment is atonement, and the atonement is with the com-
munity, not just the direct victim, 53 then it requires a commitment
by the community to reintegrate the offender and be willing to deal
with her. In this sense, Arendt is right to say that if we cannot
forgive, we cannot punish and if we cannot punish, then we cannot
forgive.54 In traditional communities, it is exile or shunning, not
death, that is the "last ditch" expedient for dealing with crime. By
contrast, in traditional societies even a death penalty is a moral
judgment that recognizes the offender as responsible and human,
though perhaps able to atone only in death.
In our day, prisons and mental hospitals are where we "keep"
our moral monsters in exile. We talk retributivism and "just
deserts," but the truth is that we don't really believe that offenders
are "equal" again once they have paid their "debt to society." In-
stead, we do not care much about what happens to offenders as
long as they stay away from us. We "incapacitate" them as though
they were mere animals, blaming their keepers, not them, when
they escape and reoffend. 56 Reintegration has not been the focus
52. Id. at 1806.
53. Garvey is not so clear about this, but does recognize that victim-offender me-
diation is not by itself sufficient. Id. at 1829-30. He sees a place for public penance,
though mostly as a way of expressing the victim's worth (a characterization I would
resist as too close to the see-saw view of retribution) and working out the offender's
self-hatred. See id. at 1819. I would just add that the reason penance and not just
restitution to the victim is required is because the wrong is a wrong to all. The pen-
ance serves as a public, tangible, demonstration of remorse that prepares the defend-
ant to receive the community's forgiveness. If the offender is not penitent, the
reconciliation never is realized. However, the community may nonetheless have the
obligation to set the stage and give the offender the opportunity to make his self-
imposed exile into a penance. Punishment, then, is the opportunity for penitence, as
in the original understanding of the penitentiary.
54. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 241.
55. See Garvey, supra note 49, at 1838; see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note
2, at 158 (community would hold reconciliation feast with offender who was to be
hanged); Plato, Crito, in EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY CRITO PHAEDO PHAEDRUS 147
(Harold North Fowler trans., 1914) Socrates chooses death over exile, because he
cannot leave his community without leaving himself behind. See Plato, supra.
56. See Meyer, supra note 17, at 668-69; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAw-
KINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME ch. 1
(1995) (noting that incapacitation has, by default, taken a dominant role in justifying
punishment).
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of most of our current schemes of punishment. On the contrary,
we segregate offenders even after they have done their time
through Megan's laws, loss of voting rights, sex offender civil com-
mitment statutes57 and job disqualifications. We have lost the
sense of the jury and grand jury as a voice of the community, set-
ting the terms of reintegration. The restorative justice movement,
however flawed, that emphasizes reintegration of offenders and of-
fers models for bringing victims and offenders together,58 offers a
note of hope that a new paradigm for punishment will emerge from
the demise of retributivism and recapture some older intuitions
about criminal justice. 59
D. Ground in Human Finitude
The centrality of forgiveness has its root in the basic condition of
human life: we intend, plan and think like gods, but we are finite
both in power and duration and we live only one moment at a time.
Hence, for example, though we act and intend as though we can
control our destinies, we cannot be master of all the consequences
of our actions.
Hannah Arendt has written that the human condition requires
something like forgiveness in its very basis, because we cannot, as
57. See Sherry F. Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of "Mentally Ill
and Dangerous," 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341 (1999).
58. See, e.g., MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RE-
STORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING L.ENSES
(1990). Insofar as the movement leaves out community and puts the burden of recon-
ciliation on the victim exclusively (and it is a heavy burden, see Brown, supra note
31), I would suggest amendment. However, some models include community partici-
pation. For example, Vermont has a community-based reparative probation board.
See Michael Tonry, U.S. Sentencing Systems Fragmenting, 10 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1,
10 (1999). We should also not forget that the state itself serves as a community voice,
at least with respect to those deeply-agreed-upon norms at the heart of the criminal
law. The state, however, has abdicated its obligation to reintegrate and forgive.
59. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND CULTURE 207 (1990).
Puritan penal rituals - in theory at least - were not intended to isolate
offenders and show them to be alien. Instead the arrangements of the cere-
mony ... were intended to demonstrate an intimate link between the of-
fender and the community of believers. Onlookers were made to feel that
they too could be tempted into sin ... In other words the sinner-offender
was not conceived as "Other" but rather as a kind of Protestant Everyman, a
living example of the potential for evil which lies in every heart and against
which every soul must be vigilant. In keeping with this conception, the de-
nouement of each public ceremony was aimed not at the vanquishing of the
enemy, but instead at the reinclusion of the atoned and repentant sinner.
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finite, be responsible for all the consequences of our actions into
infinity.6 ° She writes:
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what
we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined
to one single deed from which we could never recover; we
would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike
the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break
the spell.61
Reason would require responsibility, but finitude makes it impossi-
ble. Hence, for example, the legal doctrine of proximate cause in
both criminal and tort law seems a sort of arbitrary, though neces-
sary, limitation on human responsibility.
Arendt says that the cure for the infinity into which we project
ourselves is forgiveness - a commitment to cut off the conse-
quences of past actions in order to make possible a new start,62
which is action itself. We cannot act unless we are forgiven. Yet
one cannot forgive oneself - someone else has to do it. Hence,
contrary to Kant,63 the presence of others is necessary for the very
actualization of human reason - community, not individuality, is
the ground of human action. As Archbishop Tutu put it, "a person
is a person through other persons. 64
Heidegger puts the thought the other way around: we are re-
sponsible only because we take over being a basis for ourselves65
- accept responsibility for what we are (and what we did not make
or do). What we are is already set out for us by the world and the
others in it; we are finite and do not make ourselves. Our place is
made before we fill it. Yet, this "self," to be responsible for its
actions, must first take responsibility for being as it is, though no
action of the self made the self. Hence, responsibility cannot be
only for what we do, and at the same time, cannot be for every-
thing we do. The basic premise of criminal law must be tempered
by the recognition of finitude at both ends: we are responsible for
more and for less than we do. More needs to be done to work
60. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 240-41.
61. Id. at 237.
62. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 237. Martha Minow has explored how forgive-
ness makes possible a "new start" after a regime of terror. See Minow, supra note 40,
at 91-92.
63. See KANT, supra note 11, at 53-54, 57-63 (deriving duties to others from an
analysis of the concept of will).
64. See Tutu, supra note 5.
65. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 330 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962).
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through the underpinnings of human responsibility,6 6 but the direc-
tion in which we need to go is clear.
If responsibility is itself not a creature of individual will, then
punishment need not be the "just deserts" or universalized maxim
of that will. The individual cannot be so neatly marked off from
the rest of us, either as an actor or as an offender, and hence, the
basic condition of being-with-others should focus and undergird
the theory of punishment. This opens the door for an understand-
ing of mercy that does not undermine punishment, but completes
it.
V. FORGIVENESS AND PITY
The quotation I began with67 shows another, less attractive, side
of forgiveness - what Nietzsche calls "pity. '68 "I forgive you" can
be condescending, widening the gap between self and offender
rather than closing it.69 The defendant in Dostoevsky's quotation
will be "crushed" by mercy and "horror-stricken" and "more un-
worthy than all."'70
Nietzsche recognized that pity demeans and shames, "an agreea-
ble impulse of the instinct for appropriation at the sight of what is
weaker."71 It also makes the suffering of another superficial:
But whenever people notice that we suffer, they interpret our
suffering superficially. It is the very essence of the emotion of
pity that it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is
distinctively personal. Our 'benefactors' are, more than our en-
emies, people who make our worth and will smaller.72
66. For attempts at this daunting philosophical task, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Re-
sponsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992); see also
LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY (1992). Also, see the emergence of "charac-
ter theories" of responsibility. See Sherry F. Colb, The Character of Freedom, 52
STAN. L. REV. 235 (1999); Sherry F. Colb, The Three Faces of Evil, 86 GEO. L.J. 677
(1998); Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992). See gener-
ally Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment. An Essay on Choice,
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719 (1992).
67. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1.
68. See infra notes 70-74.
69. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 31.
70. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1. See also Romans 12:19-20 (stating that generosity
to an enemy will "heap coals of fire on his head").
71. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 176 (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
1974).
72. Id. at 269.
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And, the power and "richness" to forgive may also accompany a
view of offenders as mere "parasite[s]," "incapable of discharging
their debt."73
And yet, (for Nietzsche there is always an "and yet") Nietzsche
himself calls for the "self-overcoming of justice: . .. grace ' 74 and
justice as "love with seeing eyes."75 He seems to envision an un-
derstanding of grace or love that does not demean others like pity
does, but becomes a better justice. He cannot, however, get there:
the superman is above all a self-willed willer who cannot love an-
other without destroying the otherness of the other in an imperial-
istic embrace. The superman can either reject the other, or will the
other to be self, resulting in pity-like appropriation, not love. But
the superman cannot give over the power to will to another, even
in part, i.e., cannot accept another's authority.76
What even Nietzsche, smasher of cultural idols, is unable to do is
to give up individualism,77 our precious enlightenment inheritance.
Yet, to cross over to the other is to give up some part of one's self.
The offender must accept more than his due, accept a gift, a reun-
ion he does not deserve, that will not make him "even." He must
also give up his willful selfishness that was the root of his crime,
and accept the "yoke" of reason - reason he did not will for him-
self but must take also as a given. The victim must give up her
"rights" to justice and compensation, her injured pride and resent-
ment, her boundaries and security (doubly precious now after be-
ing invaded), take a less personal perspective on the offender that
replaces repugnance with understanding, and risk "dealing" with
the offender.78 For this, our individualism does not prepare us well.
We are not at all sure that we want the "vast obligation" of forgive-
ness instead of the "I am even" of justice. We are not at all sure
73. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 72 (Walter Kauf-
mann trans., 1967).
74. Id.
75. Friedrick Wilhem Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
NIETZSCHE 71 (T. Common trans., Modern Library ed. 1937).
76. See Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990) (convey-
ing a similar understanding of Nietzsche).
77. Or, perhaps, what we are unable to do, given our philosophical position in
history.
78. I will no doubt be chided as anti-feminist for my views here. We are supposed
to be raising our consciousnesses and allowing ourselves the self-esteem to feel re-
sentment, anger, and seek retribution. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 109-27
(1997). Although men may have much to teach women about self-respect, if I may be
so "essentialist," women may have much to teach men about forgiveness. See id. at
22-93. We need not degrade ourselves or consent to abuse, but we must take risks.
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that we want our individual boundaries permeated. Again, Nietz-
sche puts it so well:
There was a time in our lives when we were so close that nothing
seemed to obstruct our friendship and brotherhood, and only a
small footbridge separated us. Just as you were about to step on
it, I asked you: "Do you want to cross the footbridge to me?" -
Immediately, you did not want to any more; and when I asked
you again, you remained silent. Since then mountains and tor-
rential rivers and whatever separates and alienates have been
cast between us, and even if we wanted to get together, we
couldn't. But when you now think of that little footbridge,
words fail you and you sob and marvel.79
To change our understanding of punishment is to change our un-
derstanding of community to something we are, and not something
we will. Its reverberations require even a new understanding of
justice itself.
VI. REDEFINITION OF JUSTICE
Scholars often separate forgiveness from mercy, defining the for-
mer as an emotional change in the victim that may come before or
after punishment, and the latter as an act of remission or mitigation
of punishment. 80 Scholars have also argued that justice is the staff
of political life and mercy should only nibble at the edges lest it
overwhelm justice and destroy community.8 1
I have argued, however, that forgiveness and mercy are deeply
related and that they are more central to the creation of commu-
nity than is justice. As a factual matter, justice is not the norm, but
the exception. Few crimes are reported, few offenders are ar-
rested, few arrests are prosecuted, and very, very few offenders go
to trial to seek "justice" rather than a negotiated settlement. At
each stage, some of the offenders are forgiven (by victims, police
and/or prosecutors).82 In civil cases, the same is true: settlement,
79. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 71, at 90; see also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND
GOOD AND EVIL 224 (Walter Kaufman trans., 1966).
80. See supra note 27.
81. See R.J. O'Shaughnessy, Forgiveness, 42 PHIL. 336 (1967); Joseph Beatty, FOR-
GIVENESS, 7 AMER. PHIL. Q. 246 (1970); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 161,
162-86; P. Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness, 36 ANALYSIS 84 (1976); H.R.T. Roberts,
Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352 (1971); KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY,
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 188-92 (1989).
82. An emphasis on justice may overlook that forgiveness is often not extended as,
readily to minority offenders. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 38, at 109-
13. Though the response to this is usually to call for eliminating "discretion," I believe
this is neither realistic nor helpful. Even the rule of law requires rulers who honor it
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not justice, is the norm. Although not all failures to prosecute are
instances of forgiveness, often the contrition of an offender and
restitution to the victim will contribute to a decision to give a case
lower priority or to "let bygones be bygones." Moreover, in every-
day life, we give many second chances and even more benefits of
the doubt to friends, family members, and associates for the sake of
continuing and preserving the relationships.83 As the quotation
from Dostoevsky underscores, equality may also mean anomie, dis-
tance and lack of relationship;84 obligation, on the other hand, is
relationship - literally a ligature binding us together.
At a deeper level, however, we have still to answer Anselm's
paradoxes.85 Mercy seems either irrational or redundant, because
if it followed reason, it would be justice.8 6 And, mercy seems un-
and must be trusted not to fiddle around with the rules. Excessive or convenient
formalism is also unjust. Instead, we must work harder to fill out the vision of offend-
ers who are not "like us" in order to avoid characterizing them as "outlaws" and
"others." See id.
83. Children may be an exception, for their punishments are necessary to moral
education. See Morris, supra note 33. But neither do they "get what they would de-
serve" were they adults - I don't punish my children's' lies as I would adult perjury
- and reconciliation is essential.
84. See ROBERT H. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (arguing that individualism undermines
moral commitment and community service); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (same).
85. See ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, PROSLOGION chs. IX-XI, in A SCHOLASTIC
MISCELLANY: ANSELM TO OCKHAM 78, 81 (Eugene R. Fairweather ed., 1946); MUR-
PHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 168-69 (discussing Anselm's paradoxes).
But how canst thou spare the wicked if thou art wholly just and supremely
just? For how does the wholly and supremely just do something that is not
just? But what justice is there in giving eternal life to one who deserves
eternal death? 0 good God, good to the good and to the evil, on what
ground dost thou save the evil, if this is not just, and thou doest nothing that
is not just? Can it be that thy goodness is incomprehensible, lying hidden in
the inaccessible light where thou dwellest? Surely in the deepest and most
secret place of thy goodness there lies hidden the source from which the
river of thy mercy flows. For though thou art wholly and supremely just, yet
thou art kind even to the evil, just because thou art completely and su-
premely good. For thou wouldest be less good, if thou wert not kind to any
evildoer.... At the same time, though we may be able to grasp why thou
canst will to save the wicked, we can find no reason to explain why, among
men who are equally evil, thou does save some, and not others, through thy
supreme goodness, and dost condemn the latter, and not the former, through
thy supreme justice.
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, supra, chs. IX-XI.
86. See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 181; H. Scott Hestevold, Dis-
junctive Desert, 20 AMER. PHIL. Q. 357 (1983); James P. Sterba, Can A Person Deserve
Mercy?, 10 J. SOC. PHIL. 11 (1979).
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fair, because it treats like cases differently.8 7 How can mercy not
undermine justice?
I would answer Anselm's paradox this way: it seems a paradox
only when applied to God, not when applied to human beings who
exist in time.
First, justice is not equality simpliciter, of course,88 but the treat-
ment of like cases alike. But when are cases alike? We finite crea-
tures see only a few cases at a time, and we are ourselves
constantly in motion, changing and growing daily. Each case poses
new facts, and as we see the facts in new lights against other facts,
justice glimmers differently. We cannot capture it in a code for all
time, we can only capture it for a moment, perhaps, in a particular
case. As the common law recognizes, justice keeps moving, just
around the bend, and the cases of yesterday are distinguished in
light of new facts. 89 For finite creatures, justice can never be codi-
fied and eternalized, but is a pilgrim's progress.
Second, as our view of the world is finite and in time, so also is
our language. True justice is equity not equality, 90 but equity can-
not be said in the clumsy generalities that we must use to say it. As
human reason and language itself requires generalization and fuzzy
family-resemblance sorts of categories, human reason can never
fully contain justice. We instead must live by the rough justice of
the rule of law, which is of course better than lawlessness, but itself
depends on a cultural commitment to justice. Without the gui-
dance of ever-elusive justice, the rule of law would be a senseless
and mindless formalism. Without judicial good faith and cultural
87. For example, Justice Blackmun expressed this frustration with current death
penalty jurisprudence, which tries to cabin juror's discretion in order to promote
equality at the same time that it allows full exploration of all mitigating evidence, in
an eloquent dissent from denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S.
Ct. 1127 (1994). Justice Thomas has also famously argued that the "power to be leni-
ent is [also] the power to discriminate," and argued that capital sentencing jurors
should not be allowed to give unfettered effect to mitigating evidence. See Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 492 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. See Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY
HOUSE 7-13 (1968) (imagining a world of absolute equality, where those born beauti-
ful must disfigure themselves, those born graceful must hobble themselves, etc.)
89. See Linda Ross Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 423, 465-76 (1994) (discussing the temporality of the common
law).
90. See ARISTOTLE, 5 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS x. 3-8 (1951).
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commitment, 9' the rule of law would be a Kafkaesque farce and
pretense.
Third, there is no way to guarantee that equity is not perfidy: the
power to give justice is the power to discriminate, to paraphrase
Justice Thomas. We never know whether parity or disparity in sen-
tencing is unfairness or better justice, except when we judge
roughly by aggregation. We never know all the facts, we never
prove all the facts, we never exhaust the possible comparisons and
contrasts with other cases, we never perfectly define the rule.
Fourth, people do not exist in an eternal moment, either, but are
constantly changing their minds, projecting new actions into the
world, learning and growing. We cannot reduce them to one mo-
ment only, to one crime' or one good deed.93 Justice for yester-
day's action, therefore, may be unjust by the time it is determined
and imposed - justice always races ahead and lags behind us.
So, if justice is equity, it cannot be the usual, the modal form of
interaction with a few merciful exceptions. Justice itself is at best
the exception. (But that does not mean we do not seek it and live
with the uncertainty). 94
CONCLUSION
We grant ourselves and each other forgiveness and mercy in rec-
ognition of the uncertainty of justice and in recognition of our own
finitude and need for new beginnings. We must be humble in judg-
ing.95 We cannot rely on justice to arbitrate our relationships; we
have to take risks. It is mercy and forgiveness, that lets us get on
with living and recognizes that we cannot be litigating Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce96 forever. To live is to forgive and to risk and to be uncer-
tain and to outstrip language and reason itself. To use Jean Hamp-
91. Here, I am thinking of something along the lines of Llewellyn's "steadying
factors." See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
19-61 (1960).
92. See HOWARD ZEHR, DOING LIFE: REFLECTIONS OF MEN AND WOMEN SERV-
ING LIFE SENTENCES (1996) (attempting to humanize "lifers" for us through a series
of portraits).
93. See Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting plea for leni-
ency based on prior good deeds).
94. We do live with the uncertainty. See Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable
Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1467, 1525-28 (1996); BALKIN, supra note 13, 142-70.
95. See Brett Scharffs, Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 127 (1998); Linda Ross Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal
Truth, 67 U. CINN. L. REV. 727, 753 (1999).
96. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HouSE (George Ford & Sylvere Monod eds.,
1977).
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ton's term, we can only "morally hate" the dead, but, if we are to
continue to see another as human, we must forgive the living.
9 7
97. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 146-47.
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